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Five Supreme Court Constitutions: Race-Based Scrutiny 
Past, Present, and Future* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the birth of the U.S. Constitution, one of its most persistent 
questions has concerned the disparate treatment of races. Like an 
organism that gradually accommodates environmental stresses, the 
Constitution has evolved in response to its changed surroundings. 
In the Constitutional Conventions, the principal question of race-
based scrutiny was how to treat African-Americans and Native-Americans 
differently from caucasians. 1 Later, constitutional amendments and 
Supreme Court decisions changed the question to whether to treat racial 
minorities differently. 2 Recently the Supreme Court has moved closer 
to disallowing disparate treatment of racial minorities altogether. 3 
After the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were ratified, the Court 
repeatedly asked two questions: first, whether the federal government, 
which is limited only by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, 
must be held to the same standard as the states, which are limited by the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and second, 
whether benign discrimination4 is as suspect as malicious discrimin-
ation. 5 The changing answers to these two questions have repeatedly 
rewritten the practical effect of the Constitution, even though the text 
controlling race-based scrutiny remains unmodified. It would thus appear 
that as to race-based scrutiny, our nation has had a series of different 
constitutions governing racial issues. 
This paper explores the development of constitutional race-based 
scrutiny, focussing on the Supreme Court's recent role in creating the 
* Copyright <e 1996 by David Zimmerman. 
1. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 2 (Three-fifths Compromise and untaxed Indians excluded 
from census apportioning Congressional representatives). 
2. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
3. See Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). 
4. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). The term 
"benign discrimination" refers to race-based classifications designed to benefit racial minorities 
or correct past injustices, such as "affirmative action" programs. 
5. The term "malicious discrimination" has been defined as race-based classifications 
designed to adversely affect racial minorities. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 
(1886). 
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constitution that exists today. Part II briefly traces the textual changes 
that introduced a new constitutional framework to racial discrimination 
analysis. Part III reviews various ways the Court has fleshed out the 
constitutional text. Part IV dissects the new rule announced in Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,6 which holds that strict scrutiny applies 
uniformly to all government racial discrimination cases. Part V 
concludes with a look forward to a constitution the Court is preparing to 
create under which race-based laws will be struck down as per se illegal. 
II. THE CONSTITUTION AS IT EVOLVED TEXTUALLY 
A. The Unamended Constitution 
Nothing in the Constitution's text precludes any state or federal entity 
from drafting statutes or policies that treat persons differently based on 
their race. 7 In fact, before the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were 
added, the Constitution not only permitted racial discrimination, but 
endorsed it. The drafters effectively adopted the policy that African-
Americans were not equally protected when the drafters agreed to the 
three-fifths compromise. 8 Although on its face the Constitution 
distinguished only between "free persons" and "others," the real 
controversy was over how to apportion Congressional representatives and 
taxes based on the number of black slaves. The unamended Constitution 
also relegated Indians to an underprivileged class by excluding them for 
apportionment purposes if they were untaxed. 9 
Both of these racially discriminatory classes might be justified by 
arguing that the distinction was based purely on citizenship, since slaves 
could be deemed lesser citizens without regard to race, and that untaxed 
Indians were arguably citizens of foreign nations. But the facts that the 
vast majority of blacks in the United States were slaves, and that the 
Constitution explicitly mentioned Indians by race rather than by 
citizenship, undermine a "pure citizenship" analysis. The unamended 
Constitution not only permitted, but affirmatively sanctioned racial 
discrimination. 
6. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). 
7. See Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337 (1943) (suggesting that 
because the Fifth Amendment does not contain an equal protection clause it does not restrict 
federal discriminatory legislation, and implies that only the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits 
state discrimination). 
8. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
9. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2. 
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B. The Pre-Civil War Fifth Amendment 
The passage of the Fifth Amendment imposed a new requirement that 
before persons could be deprived of life, liberty, or property, they had 
to be afforded due process. 10 But even assuring due process did not 
require that laws be drafted to impact each race equally. In Detroit Bank 
v. United States, 11 the Court recognized that "the Fifth [Amendment] 
contains no equal protection clause and it provides no guaranty against 
discriminatory legislation by Congress." 12 Consequently, as originally 
interpreted, the Fifth Amendment allowed both the states and the federal 
government to enact discriminatory laws. The only protection afforded 
a minority citizen subject to such laws was the right to demand due 
process in the execution of a discriminatory law. 
C. The Fourteenth Amendment 
As far as racial discrimination analysis is concerned, the modern 
textual Constitution was born in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibited state racial discrimination for the first time: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 13 
Thus, the text prohibited the states from enacting discriminatory laws, but 
remained silent about whether the federal government was subject to that 
requirement. 14 
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
11. 317 u.s. 329 (1943). 
12. /d. at 337. Detroit Bank post-dated passage of the Fourteenth Amendment which did 
include an equal protection clause, but the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment was explicitly 
directed only at the states and was assumed to have no effect on Congress. See U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 1. 
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1. The term "citizen" was broadly defined in the first 
sentence of the Amendment to include "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof." ld. Consequently, former black slaves born in the 
United States became citizens. 
14. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2105 (1995); see also Detroit 
Bank, 317 U.S. at 337 ("Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment the Fifth Amendment provides no 
guaranty against discriminatory legislation by Congress."); Helvering v. Lerner Stores Corp., 
314 U.S. 463, 468 (1941) ("A claim of unreasonable classification or inequality in the 
incidence or application of a tax raises no question under the Fifth Amendment which contains 
no equal protection clause."); LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377, 392 (1921) 
(holding cases decided under the Fourteenth Amendment inapposite to Fifth Amendment issue 
since the "Fifth Amendment has no equal protection clause"). 
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II. THE CONSTITUTION AS REWRITTEN BY THE COURT 
Although the text of the Constitution treating racial discrimination 
has remained unchanged since the passage of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, the effective Constitution-the body of law defined by 
courts interpreting the Constitution-has undergone numerous changes. 
It is now a dramatically different creature than it once was. During this 
evolutionary process, the U.S. Supreme Court has effectively created four 
different constitutions with respect to racial discrimination since the 
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. These constitutions have been 
progressively more suspicious of using race to determine citizen rights as 
they gradually require stricter scrutiny of both state or federal actions. 
Each of these four constitutions narrowed the definition of legal race-
based classifications and together they point toward ultimately adopting 
a fifth constitution disallowing all race-based classifications as per se 
illegal. 
A. The Court's First Constitution: Plessy v. Ferguson and 
Not-So-Strict Scrutiny of State Racial Classifications 
As noted above, the Supreme Court originally interpreted the Fifth 
and the Fourteenth Amendments as operating independently of one 
another because the more restrictive Fourteenth Amendment applied on 
its face only to the states. 15 The federal government was thus free to 
enact any racially discriminatory law so long as it did not deny due 
process under the Fifth Amendment. States, on the other hand, were 
barred from enforcing maliciously discriminatory laws. 16 
However, despite the explicit mandate that states grant all citizens 
equal protection, these restrictions on state freedom to discriminate were 
surprisingly loose. In Plessy v. Ferguson, 17 the Court upheld a state 
statute requiring "separate but equal" buses for blacks and whites. 18 
The Court justified its holding by narrowly construing the Fourteenth 
Amendment: 
The object of the [Fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly to enforce 
the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature 
of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based 
upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, 
or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. 
15. See Detroit Bank, 317 U.S. at 337. 
16. /d. 
17. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
18. !d. at 548-49. 
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Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation . . . do not 
necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have 
been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency 
of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police power. 19 
165 
This analysis explicitly upheld the use of color as a valid criterion for 
state law applications. Not only was race a valid factor, it could be the 
only factor as long as one could argue that the rights of different races 
were roughly equal. 
B. The Court's Second Constitution: Brown v. Board of Education 
and Bolling v. Sharpe Imposed Heightened Scrutiny on Malicious 
Racial Classifications 
1. Malicious State Discrimination 
Eventually, the Court broadened the definition of unconstitutional 
malicious discrimination when it overruled Plessy in Brown v. Board of 
Education10 and declared segregated public schools to be inherently 
unequal, and therefore unconstitutional. 21 A dramatically different 
constitution-a second constitution-was thus created to govern race-
based state laws. Race was no longer an acceptable factor unless the 
state could satisfy strict scrutiny. To meet this test, states were required 
to show a compelling interest furthered by the most narrowly tailored 
means possible. 
The Brown v. Board of Education decision took an important step 
when it held that malicious discrimination violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. By finding that " [ s ]eparate 
educational facilities are inherently unequal, "22 Brown implied that 
segregation was malicious discrimination and paved the way for the Court 
to strike down numerous segregation laws. 23 Eventually the Court not 
only held that "a State may not constitutionally require segregation of 
19. /d. at 544. 
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
21. !d. at 493. 
22. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
23. See, e.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 
(1958) (parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 
879 (1955) (golf courses); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 
(1955) (beaches). Cf Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (municipal airport 
facilities, restrooms, and restaurants). 
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public facilities, "24 but found other laws based strictly on racial classifi-
cations unconstitutional because they were malicious. 25 
But the Brown holding only applied to the states and did not extend 
to the federal government. The Court held that "by reason of the 
segregation complained of, [the black plaintiffs were] deprived of the 
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such 
segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. "26 Had the Court reached this second issue, it might have 
limited the federal government indirectly by virtue of the parallel due 
process clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. But it opted to 
use a different case involving federal activity to test malicious discrimina-
tion under the Fifth Amendment. 
2. Malicious Federal Discrimination 
Bolling v. Sharpe27 provided the Supreme Court with the opportuni-
ty to expand Brown to govern federal race-based actions. Interestingly, 
Bolling was decided on the same day as Brown and relied heavily on 
Brown's reasoning. 28 Because it arose out of a challenge to segregated 
schools in the District of Columbia, which is part of the federal 
government, the Fifth Amendment applied and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment did not. 29 This posed a difficult question for the Court because 
equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment "is a more 
explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than 'due process of law' 
[required by the Fifth Amendment], and, therefore, [the Court did] not 
imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. "30 
The Court answered this difficult question with surprising ease and 
brevity, holding that federal race-based classifications were subject to the 
same scrutiny that applied to state actions: "[l]t would be unthinkable 
that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal 
Government. We hold that racial segregation in the public schools of the 
District of Columbia is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by 
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. "31 
24. Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963). 
25. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (interracial marriages); 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (interracial cohabitation). 
26. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
27. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
28. /d. at 500. 
29. /d. at 498. 
30. /d. at 499. 
31. /d. at 500. 
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Although the Court does not explicitly state the minimum standards 
that state and federal governments must satisfy for malicious discrimina-
tion to pass constitutional muster, the Court does say that racial 
segregation in public schools fails to be "reasonably related to any proper 
governmental objective, "32 and that " [ c ]lassifications based solely upon 
race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are . . . 
constitutionally suspect. "33 However, later cases explain that in order 
to satisfy the Constitution, invidious discriminatory classifications must 
pass the "most rigid scrutiny. "34 
D. The Court's Third Constitution: Strict Scrutiny of Benign State 
Racial Classifications With Intermediate Scrutiny of Benign Federal 
Racial Classifications under Richard v. Croson and Metro 
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC 
Beginning in the 1970's, the Court faced a new discrimination 
question: whether benign discrimination (governmental programs 
designed to benefit minorities) should be subject to the same strict 
scrutiny as malicious discrimination. The Court struggled with this 
highly controversial issue for more than a decade, rendering only 
plurality opinions. 35 Then, in 1989 and 1990, the Court finally 
provided majority holdings that established the level of scrutiny applicable 
to benign discrimination. Thus, a third constitution was born. 
1. The Plurality Opinions 
The first of the plurality cases was Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke. 36 In that case the Court upheld the use of race in 
medical school admissions to a state university. Justice Powell, who 
wrote the disposition of the case, called for "the most exacting judicial 
examination" of benign discrimination. 37 But he stood alone in his vote 
for such a high standard. Four dissenting justices voted for an intermedi-
ate standard requiring important governmental objectives substantially 
32. !d. 
33. !d. at 499. 
34. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). 
35. See, e.g., Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); 
Fullilove v. Klutznik, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 
267 (1986). 
36. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
37. !d. at 291 (Powell, J., plurality). 
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related to those objectives. 38 The other four justices decided the case 
exclusively on statutory grounds. 39 
Two years later, in Fullilove v. Klutznik, 40 the Court upheld a 
federal affirmative action program, though again without a majority 
opm10n. Three justices voted to uphold the statute at issue under a 
nondescript "most searching examination" test to determine constitution-
ality.41 Three justices opted for intermediate scrutiny;42 three others 
dissented, demanding strict scrutiny. 43 
In 1986, the Court produced a third plurality opinion in l\)'gant v. 
Jackson Board of Education44 when it struck down a school board's 
policy of laying off non-minority teachers to extend an affirmative 
preference to minority teachers. 45 Four justices argued for strict scruti-
ny. 46 Justice White concurred in the judgment and Justice Stevens 
dissented, neither indicating the degree of scrutiny to apply. 47 Three 
dissenting justices voted for intermediate scrutiny. 48 Still, the Court 
remained without a final word on benign discrimination. 
2. Benign State Discrimination 
Finally, in 1989, the Court produced its first clear majority decision 
determining the test for benign governmental discrimination. City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 49 arose out of a city requirement that 
general contractors under contract with the city award at least thirty-
percent of the dollar amount of each contract to minority subcontractors. 
For the first time, the Court had sufficient votes to create a majority 
holding that established a single standard. Justice Scalia agreed with 
Justice O'Connor (and the three members of the Court who joined her 
opinion) that "strict scrutiny must be applied to all governmental 
classifications by race, whether or not its asserted purpose is 'remedial' 
38. !d. at 358-59 (Brennan, J ., dissenting, joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmun, 
JJ.). 
39. !d. at 411-12, 421 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart and 
Rehnquist, JJ .). 
40. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
41. !d. at 491-92 (Burger, C.J., plurality, joined by White and Powell, JJ.). 
42. !d. at 518-19 (Marshall, J., concurring, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.). 
43. See id. at 523 (Stewart, J ., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J .); id. at 537 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). 
44. 476 u.s. 267 (1986). 
45. !d. at 273. 
46. !d. at 273 (Powell, J., plurality, joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist, J.); id. at 285 
(O'Connor, J ., concurring). 
47. !d. at 294-95 (White, J., concurring); id. at 313-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
48. !d. at 301-02 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.). 
49. 488 u.s. 469 (1989). 
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or 'benign. "'50 However, the holding was limited to state entities 
because the case did not involve federal action and therefore did not 
require the Court to construe the Fifth Amendment due process 
limitations on the federal government. 
3. Benign Federal Discrimination 
One year later, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 51 the Court 
faced the question it avoided in Croson. In Metro Broadcasting the 
justices treated a Fifth Amendment challenge to the Federal Communica-
tions Commission's race-based preferences for minority-controlled 
broadcasting stations in awarding television and radio licenses. 52 This 
time the majority distinguished its holding in Croson and held that benign 
federal discrimination was subject only to intermediate scrutiny. Thus, 
benign federal racial classifications were found "constitutionally 
permissible to the extent that they serve important governmental 
objectives within the power of Congress and are substantially related to 
achievement of those objectives. "53 The Court limited Croson's strict 
scrutiny standard as applicable only to state entities, justifying the lower 
federal standard by arguing that the Court owed greater deference to 
Congress, a coequal branch of government that is not as susceptible to 
"factional politics" as the states. 54 
This series of benign discrimination cases created a third constitution 
by applying two different analytical standards: strict scrutiny, which 
applied to malicious state, malicious federal, and benign state discrimina-
tion; and intermediate scrutiny, which applied only to benign federal 
discrimination. 
III. THE COURT'S NEW CONSTITUTION: ADARAND'S STRICT 
SCRUTINY OF BENIGN FEDERAL RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS 
A. The Court's New Holding 
The Court's most recent affirmative action case revisits the holding 
of Metro Broadcasting, overrules it, and introduces a fourth Constitution 
to race-based scrutiny by sharply limiting benign federal discrimination. 
In Marand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,55 the Court held that "all racial 
50. !d. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 493 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, 
C.J., White and Kennedy, JJ.). 
51. 497 u.s. 547 (1990). 
52. /d.at547. 
53. ld. at 564-65. 
54. !d. at 565-66. 
55. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). 
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classifications imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental 
actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In 
other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are 
narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental 
interests. "56 For the first time the Court explicitly held that every kind 
of discrimination-malicious state, malicious federal, benign state, and 
benign federal-is not only immediately suspect, but must be sufficiently 
compelling and narrowly tailored to withstand a most rigorous constitu-
tional standard. 57 
B. The Majority's Survey of Prior Case Law 
The majority relied on prior case law to support its affirmative 
holding and to justify overruling otherwise binding precedent. In order 
to impose its new, uniform strict scrutiny standard, the Court felt 
compelled to overrule Metro Broadcasting which established the lower, 
intermediate scrutiny as the applicable standard in cases involving federal 
benign discrimination. 58 
The majority revisited many of the prior race-based scrutiny cases to 
extract "three general propositions with respect to governmental racial 
classifications": 1) skepticism of any racial or ethnic criteria; 2) 
consistency in drafting and applying the law to individuals without regard 
to race; and 3) congruence between the Fourteenth Amendment 
limitations on state actions and Fifth Amendment limitations on federal 
actions. 59 These propositions "lead to the conclusion that any person, 
of whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor 
subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that 
person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny. "60 This 
conclusion, the majority argued, was unwritten but clearly established law 
violated by Metro Broadcasting's aberrant holding. 61 
The Adarand majority began its survey of racial classification 
analysis by looking at Hirabayashi v. United States62 and Korematsu v. 
United States, 63 cases dealing with wartime restrictions on Japanese-
56. /d. at 2113. 
57. /d. at 2112. 
58. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564-65. 
59. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Education, 267, 273 
(1986)). 
60. /d. at 2112. 
61. /d. at 2113. 
62. 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
63. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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American citizens. 64 The Adarand majority emphasized that even in 
these early cases, the Court observed that "[d]istinctions between citizens 
solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free 
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality; ... 
making racial discriminations . . . in most circumstances irrelevant and 
therefore prohibited. "65 This, said O'Connor in Adarand, planted the 
seeds that matured in later cases as the tripartite propositions that 
required Metro Broadcasting's rejection. 
Having argued that strict scrutiny was established in its first race-
based scrutiny cases, 66 the majority touts Bolling v. Sharpe61 as holding 
that this strict standard applied equally to both state and federal ac-
tions. 68 The Bolling case, says the Adarand majority, emphasized the 
congruent requirements of both state and federal governments. "[l]t 
would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser 
duty on the Federal Government. "69 "'[T]he Constitution of the United 
States, in its present form, forbids, so far as civil and political rights are 
concerned, discrimination by the General Government, or by the States, 
against any citizen because of his race.' "70 The Court then found that 
"the resulting imposition on the Federal Government of an obligation 
equivalent to that of the States, followed as a matter of course. "71 By 
interpreting these early cases in this way, the Adarand Court essentially 
argued that even the earliest applicable precedents demanded skepticism, 
consistency, and congruence. 
The Adarand majority then argued that subsequent cases continued 
to recognize the propositions indirectly.72 McLaughlin v. Florida/3 for 
example, invalidated race-based state legislation by relying on cases that 
arose out of race-based federal laws. 74 This, notes the Adarand 
majority, suggests that "the [McLaughlin] Court understood the standards 
64. The Hirabayashi case considered a curfew imposed exclusively on persons of 
Japanese ancestry. 320 U.S. at 83. The Korematsu case arose out of an order excluding 
Japanese descendants from the "West Coast war area." 323 U.S. at 218. 
65. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100. 
66. The majority asserts that "the Court first faced a Fifth Amendment equal protection 
challenge to a federal racial classification" in Hirabayashi. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2106. 
67. 347 U.S. 498 (1954). 
68. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2100. 
69. /d. at 2111 (quoting Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500). 
70. /d. at 2107 (quoting Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499 (quoting Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 
U.S. 565, 591 (1896))) (emphasis added by Adarand majority). 
71. /d. 
72. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2107. 
73. 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
74. The Court quotes McLaughlin's citations to Bolling, Korematsu, and Hirabayashi. 
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2107 (quoting McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 191-92). 
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for federal and state racial classifications to be the same. "75 O'Connor 
then cites W!inburger v. Wiesenfeld'6 as an explicit statement that equal 
protection claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have 
"always been precisely the same. "77 
The Court then tracks race-based scrutiny through a series of benign 
discrimination cases78 that had been interpreted as establishing a lesser 
standard for benign discrimination. 79 However, the Court rebuffs such 
interpretation, claiming that the cases could not and did not undermine 
the three established propositions demanding uniform strict scrutiny 
because those cases produced only plurality opinions incapable of setting 
binding precedent. The Marand Court stated that "[t]he Court's failure 
to produce a majority opinion in Bakke, Fullilove, and "Jgant left 
unresolved the proper analysis for remedial race-based governmental 
action. "80 
The answer to the confusion over what rule controlled benign 
discrimination came in part in Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 81 argued 
the majority, when "the Court finally agreed that the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires strict scrutiny of all race-based action by state and 
local governments. "82 In other words, Croson simply made explicit 
what prior cases since Hirabayashi had implied: race-based distinctions 
must be viewed narrowly regardless of the alleged benign or malicious 
impetus behind them. The Court then reasoned that Croson, as the first 
Supreme Court case containing a true majority opinion, established the 
first binding precedent dealing specifically with benign discrimination. 
Having argued that prior cases established skepticism, consistency, 
and congruence as the paramount principles underlying race-based 
analysis, and having downplayed Bakke, Fullilove, and "Jgant as 
decisions lacking binding precedent, the Court was prepared to challenge 
the majority holding of Metro Broadcasting. Metro Broadcasting 
distinguished between the powers of the federal government and those of 
the states, holding that malicious discrimination was always subject to 
75. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2107. 
76. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
77. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2109. (quoting Weinburger, 420 U.S. at 638 n.2). The Court 
also relies on Buckley v. Val eo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) ("Equal protection analysis in the Fifth 
Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.") and United States v. 
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166, n.16 (1987) (Brennan, J., plurality) (Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments are coextensive). 
78. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2108. 
79. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990). 
80. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2109. 
81. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
82. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2110. 
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strict scrutiny, but that the federal government should be allowed greater 
leeway when discriminating for benign purposes. 83 Consequently, 
"'benign' federal racial classifications ... 'are constitutionally permissi-
ble to the extent that they serve important governmental objectives within 
the power of Congress and are substantially related to achievement of 
those objectives. '"84 In other words, Metro Broadcasting required 
intermediate scrutiny. 
The Court characterizes Metro Broadcasting as an aberration, 
deviating from prior precedent in two ways. First, it "turned its back" 
on Croson's explanation that activities are not readily classified as benign 
or malicious and therefore must always be subjected to strict scrutiny: 
"Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses 
of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important 
enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. "85 Second, Metro 
Broadcasting flatly violated the congruence proposition by applying 
different standards of review to state and federal actions, 86 and conse-
quently undermining skepticism of race-based classifications and 
consistency of treatment without regard to race. "Metro Broadcasting 
was thus a significant departure from much of what had come before 
it. ,87 
Such deviation required correction, according to the Court. "We 
think that well-settled legal principles pointed toward a conclusion 
different from that reached in Metro Broadcasting. We do not depart 
from the fabric of the law; we restore it. "88 
B. Questioning the Adarand Majority's Historical Survey of Race-
Based Scrutiny 
A close look at the Adarand majority's characterization of race-based 
scrutiny raises serious questions. In Adarand the Court argued that early 
cases established unwritten law that was consistently adhered to until 
Metro Broadcasting unjustifiably deviated, and that the Court was merely 
extrapolating the evolutionary trend expressed in cases up to Croson to 
arrive at the holding in Adarand. However, Adarand does not simply 
make explicit what was previously implied. 
83. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564-65. 
84. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112 (quoting Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564-65) 
(emphasis added by the Adarand majority). 
85. /d. (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (O'Connor, J., plurality)). 
86. /d. 
87. /d. 
88. /d. at 2115. 
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The first problem in the majority's analysis is the way it continually 
refers to the text of previous decisions while virtually ignoring their 
outcome. For example, the Adarand Court rests its premise on the 
statements in Hirabayashi and Korematsu that racial classifications are 
subject to the strictest scrutiny. 89 However, these cases actually upheld 
the incarceration and curfews imposed on Japanese-Americans solely 
because of their race, giving little more than lip service to the strict 
scrutiny of which the Court had written. Thus, the outcome of the cases 
suggests that the early Court adopted a far lower standard than the 
Adarand Court contends. The Adarand Court's analysis is in serious 
question because unless a true strict scrutiny standard was originally 
established to analyze federal actions, the Court cannot honestly argue 
that Metro Broadcasting deviated from the three'long-standing, consistent-
ly followed propositions of skepticism, consistency, and congruence. 
The majority claims to be baffled by Korematsu's inexplicable 
holding, implying that the Court actually established a meaningful strict 
scrutiny standard based on the three propositions and then failed to follow 
it. But after looking to the language of the cases, such surprise appears 
to be unjustified or feigned. The Hirabayashi Court explicitly found that 
"the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause and it restrains 
only such discriminatory legislation by Congress as amounts to a denial 
of due process, "90 thereby showing that the Court was not committed to 
the proposition of congruence. Then, in Plessy-like fashion, Hirabayashi 
and Korematsu upheld the discriminatory classification under the highest 
scrutiny, which was actually a weak intermediate scrutiny91 at best. 
The Adarand Court's problem with emphasis on a textual holding 
while ignoring the disposition of the cases continues when it discusses 
Fullilove. The Court dismisses that case as non-binding authority simply 
because it failed to produce a true majority opinion. 92 The Court thus 
implies that a plurality opinion is little more than academic, persuasive 
authority that may be easily ignored. By doing this, the Court carefully 
crafts its analysis to relegate the disposition to little more than procedural 
89. /d. at 2107. 
90. 320 U.S. at 100. 
91. "Intermediate scrutiny" falls between the elevated requirements of strict scrutiny and 
the relaxed rational basis standard. Unlike strict scrutiny which requires a compelling state 
interest furthered by narrowly tailored means, intermediate scrutiny requires only "important 
governmental objectives" that are "substantially related to achievement of those objectives." 
See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 565 (1990). 
92. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2109 (failure to produce a majority opinion left issue 
unresolved). 
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history, when in fact Fullilove approved a federal affirmative action 
program that depended purely on racial minority ownership. 93 
The most vexing problem with the Adarand majority's analysis is that 
Metro Broadcasting specifically held94 that benign federal discrimination 
was subject to intermediate scrutiny. 95 In so doing, that Court rejected 
the strict scrutiny established by Croson. 96 
We hold that benign race-conscious measures mandated by Con-
gress-even if those measures are not "remedial" in the sense of being 
designed to compensate victims of past governmental or societal 
discrimination-are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they 
serve important governmental objectives within the power of Congress 
and are substantially related to achievement of those objectives. 97 
The Adarand Court could not explain away Metro Broadcasting as a mere 
plurality decision as it had done with Fullilove. It had to recognize it as 
clear precedent and stare decisis. 
Justice Steven's dissent recognizes this difficulty: "As was true of 
Metro Broadcasting," he writes, "the Court in Fullilove decided an 
important, novel, and difficult question. "98 Therefore, "[p ]roviding a 
different answer to a similar question today cannot fairly be characterized 
as merely 'restoring' previously settled law. "99 Aberration or not, 
precedent must be followed under the doctrine of stare decisis. Allowing 
a collection of holdings to imply a set of propositions that may trump a 
clear holding is incongruent with the doctrine of stare decisis and leaves 
that doctrine to future abuse. 
In the end, the problems with the Adarand Court's analysis shows 
that the Court cannot realistically argue that it simply took the principles 
of the Constitution and made them explicit by correcting the aberrant 
holding in Metro Broadcasting. The propositions that the Court relies on 
were not established as clearly as the Court suggests, nor were they 
93. The fact that the Bakke and Wygant dispositions struck down affirmative action 
programs does not save the Adarand Court's treatment of Fullilove. The Bakke and Wygant 
decisions were also plurality opinions that scrutinized affirmative action programs. However, 
they dealt with state-run affirmative action programs rather than federal programs as in 
Fullilove and Adarand. Since the Adarand Court was wrestling with whether scrutiny of 
federal actions must be as strict as the scrutiny of state actions, the Bakke and Wygant 
dispositions cannot support Adarand's holding. Thus, Fullilove remains problematic in 
considering the Adarand majority's argument. 
94. Metro Broadcasting was decided five to four. 
95. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564-65. 
96. /d. at 565-66. 
97. /d. at 564-65 (emphasis added). 
98. Adarand Construction, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2128 (1995). 
99. /d. 
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adhered to as consistently as the Court would have a reader believe. 
Contrary to the Court's arguments, Adarand creates yet another 
constitution. 
IV. THE FINAL CONSTITUTION APPLYING THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION CLAUSE 
Indeed, Adarand does more than break from the past to establish a 
new uniform standard of race-based scrutiny. It looks forward to a time 
when a future Court will impose an even higher standard. In the 
majority opinion, the two concurring opinions, and even in the dissents, 
the members of the Court all anticipate "the time when race will become 
a truly irrelevant, or at least insignificant, factor." 100 The constitution 
defined in Adarand is not the final constitution. 
A. The Majority Carefully Limited Its Holding 
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion carefully and repeatedly stressed 
that it adopted only a strict scrutiny standard rather than a more 
restrictive per se rule against all racial classifications. 101 "Strict scruti-
ny," she writes in response to the dissent's objections, "does take 
'relevant differences' into account-indeed, that is its fundamental 
purpose[-]precisely to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses of 
race in governmental decisionmaking. " 102 Invariably, consistent treat-
ment of different races is not required, says the Court, because even 
though consistency as a principle forms much of the basis for the Court's 
holding, a critical difference between consistency and strict scrutiny does 
exist: 
The principle of consistency simply means that whenever the govern-
ment treats any person unequally because of his or her race, that person 
has suffered an injury that falls squarely within the language and spirit 
of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection. It says nothing 
about the ultimate validity of any particular law; that determination is 
the job of the court applying strict scrutiny. 103 
The majority distinguishes consistency from strict scrutiny in an 
attempt to allay the dissent's fear that "strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, 
but fatal in fact.'" 104 A perfectly consistent rule would be a per se 
100. See, e.g., Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113 (majority opinion) (quoting Fullilove v. 
Klutznik, 448 U.S. 448, 545 (Stevens, J., dissenting)); see also discussion infra Part IV.B. 
101. Id. at 2112. 
102. Id. 
103. Jd. 
104. Jd. at 2114 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring)). 
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rule. But the need for some race-based remedies to survive is justified, 
says the Court, because of the "unfortunate reality" that "both the 
practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority 
groups" persists. 105 
The Court cites United States v. Paradise106 as evidence that where 
there is "pervasive, systematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct" by 
a government, a narrowly tailored race-based remedy can and will 
survive strict scrutiny. 107 In Paradise, the Court recognized that the 
Alabama Department of Public Safety had a history of continuous, blatant 
discrimination against blacks. To correct this violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the district court ordered the State to hire one black trooper 
for every new white trooper hired, until blacks comprised approximately 
twenty-five percent of the state trooper force. 108 On appeal, the Court 
in Paradise upheld the district court order because of the compelling 
governmental interest in remedying past and present discrimination. 109 
The Adarand majority ratified that conclusion in order to underscore its 
commitment to a class of affirmative action programs, even if that class 
is significantly restricted to programs which satisfy the "'narrow 
tailoring' test this Court has set out in previous cases. " 110 
B. The Court Anticipates a per se Rule 
Adarand suggests in its several opinions that the time will come when 
minority preferences like those upheld in Paradise will not survive 
constitutional analysis. The majority suggests this when it adopts the 
language of Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in Fullilove. Justice 
Stevens had said that because benign racial discrimination "can only 
exacerbate rather than reduce racial prejudice, it will delay the time when 
race will become a truly irrelevant or at least insignificant factor." 111 
By adopting Steven's forward-looking statement, the majority appears 
to be doing more than simply using the tactical devise of using the words 
of the most vocal dissenter against himself. 112 The statement meshes 
105. Id. 
106. 480 U.S. 149 (1987). 
107. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 (citing Paradise, 480 U.S. at 167 (Brennan, J., plur-
ality); id. at 190 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 196 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)). 
108. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 154-55. 
109. /d. at 167. 
110. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118. 
111. ld. at 2114 (majority opinion) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznik, 448 U.S. 448, 545 
(Stevens, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added). 
112. In Adarand, Justice Stevens wrote a dissent almost twice as long as the two 
dissenting opinions by Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg combined. Consequently, the 
majority attacks Justice Stevens' analysis throughout its own opinion. 
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with the holding of Marand which takes another step in the gr~d~al 
elimination of race as a legitimate consideration. Thus, the maJOrity 
appears to advocate the ultimate adoption of a truly consistent rule, a rule 
more frigid than the slightly permissive strict scrutiny it presently 
embraces. 
The concurring opinions argue more openly for a per se rule against 
race-based classifications. Justice Scalia flatly asserts that "[i]n the eyes 
of government, we are just one race here. It is American. " 113 As a 
result, "government can never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminat-
ing on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past racial discrimina-
tion in the opposite direction. . .. Under our Constitution there can be 
no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race. " 114 Under Justice 
Scalia's reasoning, no affirmative action program would be constitutional. 
He thus espouses a per se rule without specifically calling it so. 
Justice Thomas argues as aggressively as Justice Scalia for adoption 
of principles that would create in essence a per se rule against racial 
classifications. "Government cannot make us equal," he says, "it can 
only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law." 115 But 
in so doing, "under our Constitution, the government may not make 
distinctions on the basis of race. " 116 
Two of the three dissenting opinions also suggest a commitment to 
a time when courts will not allow race-based classifications. Justice 
Souter, with whom Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined, closed his 
dissenting opinion by pointing out that some affirmative action programs 
are justified now, in part because the time will come when they will no 
longer be needed or allowed: 
When the extirpation of lingering discriminatory effects is thought to 
require a catch-up mechanism, like the racially preferential inducement 
under the statutes considered here, the result may be that some members 
of the historically favored race are hurt by that remedial mechanism, 
however innocent they may be of any personal responsibility for any 
discriminatory conduct. When this priCe is considered reasonable, it is 
in part because it is a price to be paid only temporarily . . . Justice 
Powell wrote . . . that the "temporary nature of this remedy ensures 
that a race-conscious program will not last longer than the discriminato-
ry effects it is designed to eliminate." 117 
113. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
114. /d. 
115. /d. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
116. /d. 
117. /d. at 2134 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznik, 448 U.S. 448, 513 (1995) (Souter, 1., 
dissenting)) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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Since Justice Souter expects the price of affirmative action to be paid only 
temporarily, it is evident that he anticipates a time when racial distinc-
tions will be unconstitutional. 
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg wrote "separately to underscore not 
the differences the several opinions in this case display, but the consider-
able field of agreement" among the justices "that together speak for a 
majority of the Court. " 118 One of the points she makes is that Ada-
rand's holding is not intended to be the final chapter on race-based 
classifications. "I see today's decision as one that allows our precedent 
to evolve, still to be informed by and responsive to changing condi-
tions." 119 Her own opinion and her concurrence with Justice Souter 
show that she expects social evolution through "carefully designed 
affirmative action program[s]" to eventually achieve de facto equal 
protection of minorities. 120 This, in turn, will allow the Court to 
eliminate minority preference entirely, and thereby remove race as a 
permissible factor in governmental classifications. 
V. CONCLUSION 
On occasion persons have referred to the Constitution as a "living 
Constitution," 121 suggesting that as society changes, constitutional 
interpretation must account for that development. Perhaps nowhere is the 
life of the Constitution more apparent than in race-based scrutiny. This 
area of law has evolved from being racist on its face, to subtly condoning 
racism, to strictly denouncing it unless racial classifications are absolutely 
necessary. The Supreme Court has reaffirmed that this constitutional 
evolution has not ended as the Court looks ahead to yet another 
constitution in which racial distinctions will be per se unlawful. 
David Zimmerman 
118. /d. at 2134 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
119. /d. at 2136. 
120. See id. at 2134 (Souter, J., dissenting, with Ginsburg and Bryer, JJ.). 
121. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlrneier, 484 U.S. 260, 290 (1988) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting): Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1, 26 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
